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INTRODUCTION

Over the last twenty years, American family law has changed
dramatically. We have seen the advent of no-fault divorce,1 legalized

1. In 1970, California adopted the first no-fault divorce statute in the United States. CAL.
CIV. CODE § 4507 (West 1987). By 1986, all 50 states allowed divorce on the basis of irreconcilable
differences, or similar no-fault grounds. See ALA. CODE § 30-2-1 (1983) ("irretrievable breakdown"); ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.200 (1983) ("irremediable breakdown"); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 25-312 (1976 & Supp. 1986) ("irretrievably broken"); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1202 (Supp. 1985)
("separate and apart"); CAL. CIv. CODE § 4507 (West 1987) ("irreconcilable differences"); COL.
REV. STAT. § 14-10-110 (1973) ("irretrievably broken"); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 466-40
(West 1986) ("broken down irretrievably"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1505 (1981) ("irretrievably
broken"); FLA. STAT. § 61.052 (1985) ("irretrievably broken"); GA. CODE ANN. § 30-102 (Harrison 1980 & Supp. 1986) ("irretrievably broken"); HAW. REV. STAT. § 58041 (1985) ("irretrievably broken"); IDAHO CODE § 32-603(8) (1983) ('irreconcilable differences"); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 40,
401(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987) ("irreconcilable differences"); IND. CODE ANN. §
31-1-11.5-3 (Burns 1980 & Supp. 1986) ("irretrievable breakdown"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.5
(West 1981) ("breakdown to extent no reasonable likelihood marriage can be preserved"); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-1601(a) (1983) ("incompatability"); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.170 (Baldwin
1986) ("irretrievably broken"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:301 (West Supp. 1987) (one year's
separation); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 691 (1981) ("irreconcilable differences"); MD.
FAMILY LAW CODE ANN. § 7-103 (1984) (one year's separation and no reasonable expectation
of reconciliation); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 208, § 1 (1975) ("irretrievable breakdown"); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 552.6 (Supp. 1987) ("objects of matrimony . . . destroyed"); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
518.06 (West Supp. 1987) ("irretrievable breakdown"); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-5-2 (Supp. 1986)
("irreconcilable differences"); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 452.305(2), .320 (Vernon 1986) ("irretrievably
broken"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 404-107 (1985) ("irretrievable breakdown"); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 42-347 (1984) ("irretrievably broken"); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.010 (1983) ("incompatability");
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458.7-a (1983) ("irreconcilable differences"); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:34-2d (West Supp. 1987) (18 months' separation and no reasonable prospect of reconciliation);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 404-2 (1978) ("incompatability"); N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 170(6) (McKinney
1977) (one year's separation); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (1984) (one year's separation); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 14-05-03, 14-05-09.1 (1981) ("irreconcilable differences"); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3105-01(k) (Anderson 1980) (one year's separation); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1271
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contraception2 and abortion, 3 child custody rights for unwed fathers, 4
palimony, 5 restrictions on marital testimonial privileges,6 and expansion of child abuse and neglect provisions. 7 These changes signal a
basic shift in the way society and the courts view the family. Thus,
we have rejected an established paradigm, but not yet articulated a
new oneA
The old paradigm was paternalistic and family oriented. The family
was viewed as an inherently valuable institution that was the source
of all strength and morality in the American character. 9 This idealized
family needed protection from outside influences that might weaken
12
it. Hence, divorce was discouraged,10 contraception"l and abortion
were prohibited, and conflicts between individual and family were
13
usually resolved in favor of the family.
We have documented the shift away from paternalism,14 but not
yet articulated a new paradigm to explain the changes. We must
(West 1961) ("incompatability"); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.025 (1983) ("irreconcilable differences");
23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 201(d) (Purdon Supp. 1987) ("irretrievably broken"); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 15-5-3 (Supp. 1986) (three years' separation); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-10 (Law Co-op.
1976) (one year's separation); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-4-2 (Supp. 1987) ("irreconcilable
differences"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-103 (1984) ("irreconcilable differences"); TEx. FAMILY
CODE ANN. § 3.01 (Vernon 1975) (destruction of the "legitimate ends of the marriage"); UTAH
CODE ANN. § .30-3-1(3)(h) (Supp. 1987) ("irreconcilable differences"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 551(7) (1974) (six months' separation and "resumption of marital relations is not reasonably
probable"); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91(9)(a) (1950 & Supp. 1987) (six months' separation when no
minor children); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.030 (1986) ("irretrievably broken"); W. VA.
CODE § 48-2-4(10) (1986) ("irreconcilable differences"); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.12(2)(a) (West
1981) ("irretrievably broken"); Wyo. STAT. § 20-2-104 (1987) ("irreconcilable differences").
2. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
3. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
4. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
5. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976) (en banc).
6. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
7. E.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 701-709 (1982).
8. Kuhn argues that ideas change in a set sequence. The community begins with a paradigm
that articulates the basic premises in a given field. Scholars then keep refining that paradigm.
Eventually, these refinements become criticisms that erode the underlying paradigm. As a

result, a new paradigm emerges. T.

KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS

(1970).
9. M. GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTHCENTURY AMERICA 3 (1985).
10. See Friedman, Rights of Passage: Divorce Law in Historical Perspective, 63 OR. L.
REV. 649, 653 (1984).
11. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-32 (1958) (repealed 1969).
12. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 3 (1867) (repealed 1961).
13. M. GROSSBERG, supra note 9, at 29.
14. M. GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY (1981); Schneider, Moral
Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803 (1985).
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establish a new paradigm for three reasons. First, we need to explain
coherently the changes that have occurred. Second, we need to predict
how courts may rule in the future. Finally, we need to set priorities
that will help us decide difficult issues as they arise.
Section II of this article describes the pro-family paradigm that
stressed family unity. In applying the paradigm, courts relied heavily
on notions of privacy when such notions supported family goals, but
courts disregarded privacy considerations that countered the avid pronatalism and paternalism inherent in the pro-family view. The pro-family view categorized a legally married couple and their legitimate children as good, and condemned illegitimates and other non-traditional
families as bad.
Section III describes the shift to individualism, which was largely
accomplished by creating a new constitutional right of privacy, embodied in a line of decisions supporting procreative choice. When the
new right of privacy conflicted with individualism, however, individualism still prevailed, in much the same way pro-family views had
previously prevailed. The new emphasis on individuals reflected a new
vision of strong independent women. As a result, good and bad families
were redefined, with homosexuals and members of the underclass
falling into the bad category.
Section IV discusses the two major problems associated with the
dichotomy between the family and the individual: intolerance for
heterogeneity, and unnecessary conflicts between the family and its
individual members.
Section V considers the nature of rights in general, and the problems of defining the fundamental right of privacy, as well as balancing
that right against other rights. Section V proposes a new theory of
family rights suggesting that fundamental family rights belong both
to the family as a group and to each family member individually; and
that when competing rights need to be accommodated, we should give
priority to the objectively weaker party. The theory deals with family
rights both in the vertical context, in protecting the family and its
individuals from the government; and in the horizontal context, in
allocating rights between competing family members. The theory in
the vertical context is illustrated with a discussion of the spousal
testimonial privilege and the parent/child testimonial privilege. The
theory in the horizontal context is then applied to allocate child custody
rights and alimony.
Finally, section VI discusses some of the limits on the theory of
family rights and some avenues for further research. The limitations
analyzed, however, do not undermine the theory's validity. Rather,
the analysis recognizes that refining the theory can only be accomplished by attempting to answer difficult questions.
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II.

THE FAMILY PARADIGM

A. Family Unity
Our search for a new paradigm must begin with an examination
of the old one. Traditionally, the family unit was highly valued as the
central building block of society. As Judge Traynor so eloquently expressed it: "The family is the basic unit of our society, the center of
the personal affections that ennoble and enrich human life ....

Since

the family is the core of our society, the law seeks to foster and
preserve marriage." 15
The inherent value placed on family unity meant that courts were
reluctant to intervene in family affairs on behalf of individuals. As a
result, society tolerated a great deal of abuse so long as the family
unit remained intact. Thus, in State v. Rhodes, 6 an early wife beating
case, the court criticized the husband for his conduct, but refused any
remedy. The court considered the wife's temporary pain from the
husband's beatings less evil than publicizing the private affairs of the
7
marital home.'

B.

The Role of Privacy

Family privacy became a shield behind which abusive husbands
could hide. A man's home was his castle. Except in the most egregious
circumstances, a court would not inquire as to what went on behind
the castle doors. Non-intervention was intended to protect family
unity, rather than any particular family member.
This tradition of non-intervention is an ancient one. Since the Middle Ages, courts have been reluctant to interfere in family matters.
Thus, as early as 1628, Coke noted that a wife could not testify against
her husband.,"
Schneider has suggested two basic reasons for the historical opposition to government intervention in the family. 19 First, courts had
traditionally perceived intervention as ineffective. Because the spouse
or child to be protected frequently depended on the transgressor,
intervention could cause the transgressor to retaliate or withdraw
support. Second, the specter of "Big Brother"2' was ever present.

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

DeBurgh v. DeBurgh, 39 Cal. 2d 858, 863-64, 250 P.2d 598, 601 (1952) (en bane).
62 N.C. (Phil. Law) 453 (1868).
Id. at 456-57.
E. CoKE, A CODBIENTARIE UPON LITrLETON *6b.
Schneider, supra note 14, at 1837-38.
G. ORWELL, 1984 (1949).
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This fear of government intrusion may have been incorporated in the
fourth amendment ban on unreasonable searches. The founding
fathers considered the right to be left alone one of civilized society's
most important rights.2 1 Government cannot invade an individual's
privacy without violating the individual's fourth amendment rights.22
Thus, family privacy had been deeply ingrained in our legal consciousness, and when an issue was phrased in terms of privacy, courts were
unlikely to intervene.
C.

Pronatalism

The goal of family unity was more important than family privacy,
however. At the very time courts were refusing to invade family
privacy to protect wives and children, legislatures were passing statutes prohibiting contraception 3 and abortion.24 These statutes proscribed the most private of acts behind closed doors, and intervened
directly in personal family life.? Nevertheless, these provisions were
consistent with the underlying goal of fostering family unity: "Our
whole social system is founded on the theory of husband and wife
living together as such, and the natural and reasonable expectancy is
'26
that children shall be born in that lawful wedlock.
Emphasis on the family and pronatalism meant that women were
needed at home. They were excluded from the political sphere by
statutes that denied them the right to vote. 27 Their role in the economic
world was circumscribed by protective legislation that limited their
work hours,28 and by cases that restricted the types of jobs they could

21. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("right
to be let alone" is "right most valued by civilized men").
22. Id. ("[Elvery unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual... must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.").
23. See supra note 11.
24. See supra note 12.
25. In overturning these statutes, courts cited the constitutional right of privacy. Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
26. Cunningham v. Cunningham, 48 Pa. Super. 442, 447-48 (Super. Ct. 1912).
27. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 193, § 2 (1895) (current version at ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 46, 6-26 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987)).
28. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 419 n.1 (1908). According to the Court, the following
states limited women's working hours: Colorado, Connecticut, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. Id.
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hold.- This protectionism was directly connected to the emphasis on

family. For example, the court upholding Oregon's statutory limits on
women's work hours stressed that: "[H]ealthy mothers are essential
to vigorous offspring, [so] the physical well-being of woman becomes

an object of public interest and care in order to preserve the strength
and vigor of the race." 30 As late as 1968, courts were still protecting
women from themselves in the work world. An appellate court in
California indicated that allowing women to work as bartenders would
negatively influence the women themselves, young people, and the

general public. 31
D.

Paternalismin MarriageRegulation

Similarly, paternalistic courts also protected these fragile women
from opportunistic men by granting damages for broken promises to
marry. As the court in Wightman v. Coates32 stressed, women needed
more protection than men from broken promises to marry because a
woman's life is materially affected by such "treachery. '
Various statutes also protected women from making unwise choices
of husbands. These statutes set age limits,3 health requirements,5
and even racial requirements 36 for marriage. Legislatures and courts
hoped that restricting access to marriage would create more permanent
unions. Accordingly, in In re McLaughlin's Estate,37 the court noted
that marriage was closely related to the state, and suggested that
improvident or improper marriages should be prevented.3 The new

29. See, e.g., Hargens v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Appeals Bd., 263 Cal. App. 2d 601,
69 Cal. Rptr. 868 (Ct. App. 1968) (constitutional to prohibit females from dispensing alcoholic
beverages behind any permanently affixed fixture used to serve such beverages, excepting
licensees or licensee wives), oveirruled, Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 4 Cal. 3d 56, 485 P.2d 529,
95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971) (en banc).
30. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908).
31. Hargens, 263 Cal. App. 2d at 609-10, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 874.
32. 15 Mass. 1 (1 Pick.) (1818).
33. Id. at 3. The court stated:
When the female is the injured party, there is generally more reason for a resort
to the law than when the man is the sufferer . . . . A deserted female, whose
prospects in life may be materially affected by the treachery of the man to whom
she plighted her vows, will always receive from a jury the attention her situation
requires ....
34. E.g., N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 15(2) (McKinney 1983).
35. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, 204 (Smith-Hurd 1983) (original version at ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 89, 1 6-6a (1937)).
36. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-59 (1960) (repealed 1968).
37. 4 Wash. 570, 30 P. 651 (1892).
38. Id. at 591, 30 P. at 658.
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statutes requiring marriage licenses ensured that only qualified people
would marry. Thus, in Agent v. Willis,39 the North Carolina Supreme
Court emphasized the importance of marriage licenses when it
criticized a county registrar who had issued a marriage license to an
underage couple. The court stated that marriages should be protected
by extensive laws that assure underage couples will not wrongfully
obtain licenses.4 0 By limiting access to marriage, the law protected
the family unit.
When women did marry, the law protected the marriage from

dissolution. Divorce was available only when one spouse was guilty
of extreme misconduct. 41 Spousal rights after divorce were allocated
according to prior behavior. Only pristine wives were entitled to
43
alimony 42 or custody of their children.
The preference for the family unit at the expense of individual
family members pervaded the law. Neither a spouse nor an unemancipated child could sue an immediate family member for torts. 44 The
state was even willing to support family unity at the expense of crim-

inal convictions. Thus, spouses were not allowed to testify against
45
each other in criminal cases.

E.

"Good" Families and "Bad"Families

The family that merited such broad protection was, however, very
narrowly defined. The protected family consisted of a legally married

couple and their offspring. 46 Thus, illegitimate children had no right
to inheritance 47 or support from their natural fathers. 4 Similarly,

39. 124 N.C. 21, 32 S.E. 322 (1899).
40. Id. at 23, 32 S.E. at 322.
41. See Friedman, supra note 10.
42. See, e.g., Spitler v. Spitler, 108 Ill.
120, 122 (1883) ("(If she] has, by her misconduct,
forfeited her claim upon appellant for support, she has no equitable ground upon which to claim
alimony as a right.").
43. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Addicks, 2 Serg & Rawle 174 (Pa. 1815) (holding that an
adulterous mother could not retain custody of her daughters).
44. See, e.g., Taubert v. Taubert, 103 Minn. 247, 114 N.W. 763 (1908).
45. Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
46. E. RUBIN, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN FAMILY 16 (1986).
47. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971); Strahan v. Strahan, 304 F. Supp. 40 (W.D.
La. 1969), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 949 (1971).
48. See, e.g., Holy Infancy v. Kaska, 397 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. 1965); see also Baston v. Sears,
15 Ohio St. 2d 166, 239 N.E.2d 62 (1968) (Ohio statute making non-support for illegitimate child
a crime did not create a civil cause of action for support), overruled, Franklin v. Julian, 30 Ohio
St. 2d 228, 283 N.E.2d 813 (1972) (superseded by statute as stated in Manley v. Howard, 25
Ohio App. 3d 1, 495 N.E.2d 436 (Ct. App. 1985)).
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courts refused to recognize the Mormon community's bigamous marriages or their offspring.49 The courts distinguished between good
families - those composed of lawfully wedded parents and their offspring, and bad families - those existing outside a legal marriage. Good
families received nearly absolute protection, while bad families had
virtually none.- °
III.
A.

THE SHIFT TO INDIVIDUAL PROTECTION

The ConstitutionalRight to Privacy:
A Transitionto Individualism

As noted above, society always strongly valued family privacy.
But in 1965, the Supreme Court elevated privacy into a constitutional
right when it legalized contraception in Griswold v. Connecticut.51
Justice Douglas, speaking for a plurality of the Court, noted that
although privacy was not specifically mentioned in the Constitution,
it was protected under the penumbra of the Bill of Rights. 52 In so
concluding, Douglas used the familiar language of family unity: "We
deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights ....Marriage
is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and
intimate to the degree of being sacred."' Justices Goldberg, Warren,
and Brennan agreed that marital privacy was a constitutional right,
but they relied on the ninth amendment, which preserved certain
non-enumerated rights. Justice Goldberg referred to the right of privacy as being fundamental.4
In spite of the familiar language about the sanctity of marriage,
the Court abandoned the pro-natal view typical of the pro-family era.
Courts had long touted the importance of privacy, and had even
suggested a constitutional basis for it.5 But courts had never before
defined privacy to include the right to distribute or use contraceptives.
Although the decision emphasized pro-family values, the Court was
paving the road to individual choice.

49. In re State ex. rel. Black, 3 Utah 2d 315, 283 P.2d 887 (1955).
50. For a similar analysis made in the context of criminal constitutional rights, see T.
O'Neill, The Good, the Bad, and the Burger Court:Victims' Rights and a New Model of Criminal
Review, 75 J. CRIAM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 363 (1984).
51. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
52. Id. at 484.
53. Id. at 486.
54. Id. at 491.
55. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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The Shift to Individualism and Procreative Choice

The new constitutional right of privacy quickly became not a family
right, but an individual right. In Eisenstadt v. Baird,5 the Supreme
Court extended the fundamental right to use contraceptives to single
individuals and suggested that a married couple is not a separate legal
entity, but rather a coupling of two independent and unique individuals. sUnder the pro-family paradigm, courts had adopted a pro-natal
view. The new emphasis on individual privacy supported individual
procreative choice. The Eisenstadt Court explained that for the right
of privacy to have real value, married or single individuals must be
unaffected by government influences over procreative decisions."8
Cases following Eisenstadt recognized individual constitutional rights
for minors to use contraceptives, 59 women to have early
abortions,o
6
and minors to have abortions without parental consent. 1
The new individualism reached its apex in PlannedParenthoodv.
Danforth,6 which permitted women to have abortions without spousal
consent. The Court ruled that because the state could not prohibit an
abortion, it could not delegate such authority to a husband. Moreover,
when a couple disagreed about the wisdom of the abortion, only one
opinion could prevail. Because the wife had to carry the fetus and
bear the child, she should ultimately have the power to decide. The
Court quickly disposed of the argument that mandatory spousal consent would encourage family unity. The Court declared that marital
trust would not be advanced by granting husbands veto power over
their wives' abortion decisions.6 The Court thus focused the issue on
a conflict of individual rights, and cast doubt on the government's
ability to foster family harmony.
C.

Individualism at the Expense of Privacy

In spite of the new commitment to the constitutional right of privacy, individualism prevailed when individualism and privacy con-

56. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
57. Id. at 453: "[T]he marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of
its own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional
make-up."
58.

Id.

59. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
60. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
61. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
62. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
63. Id. at 71.
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flicted. Courts were quite willing to intrude on marital privacy to
further the goals of individual independence. In the pro-family era,
family privacy had been protected by rules prohibiting spouses from
testifying against each other in criminal trials.6 In overturning that
long-standing rule, the Court, in Trammel v. United States, 5 emphasized the new independence of spouses within marriage.66 Now
spouses were free 67 to testify against each other in criminal trials.
Wife-beaters could no longer hide behind their castle doors68
In the pro-family era, courts had used the privacy doctrine to
support family unity, but disregarded privacy when it countered their
pro-natal views. With the shift to individualism, courts again relied
on privacy considerations that served the underlying goal of individual
independence, but disregarded privacy considerations that might limit
individuals.
D.

Individualism Beyond the Bounds of Privacy:
The Emergence of Stronger Women

The new emphasis on individuals reflected new societal views about
the role of women. Society no longer viewed women as subservient
homemakers who needed protection from the harsh realities of the
workplace and the political sphere. Protective legislation that prevented women from working overtime was overturned. 9 Women were
71
enfranchised, 7 and guaranteed equal pay for equal work.
The new, stronger women needed less protection in marital affairs
as well. Breach of promise actions fell into disfavor.7 Divorce became
64. Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
65. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
66. Id. at 52. "Chip by chip, over the years those archaic notions have been cast aside so
that '[n]o longer is the female destined solely for the home and the rearing of the family, and
only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas."' Id. (quoting Stanton v. Stanton,
421 U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975)).
67. Given the state's power to indict spouses as co-conspirators, such decisions were rarely
"freely" made. See Lempert, A Right to Every Woman's Evidence, 66 IowA L. REV. 725 (1981).
68. See, e.g., People v. Cameron, 53 Cal. App. 3d 786, 126 Cal. Rptr. 44 (Ct. App. 1975).
69. E.g., Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98, 40 N.E. 454 (1895).
70. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
71. Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1982).
72. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 1801 (Smith-Hurd 1980) (originally enacted as
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 89, § 25 (1948)):
It is hereby declared, as a matter of legislative determination, that the remedy
heretofore provided by law for the enforcement of actions based upon breaches of
promises or agreements to marry has been subject to grave abuses ....
Accordingly, it is hereby declared as the public policy of the state that the best interests
of the people of the state will be served by limiting the damages recoverable in
such actions ....
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more accessible with the advent of no-fault divorce. 73 Because society
viewed women as capable of supporting themselves, alimony became
more difficult for women to get. 74 Similarly, because women were no
longer viewed as the sole keepers of the hearth, courts began to
recognize more men's custody rights 75 and more frequently granted
joint custody.76
E.

A New Definition of "Good" and "Bad" Families

Because individual interests could no longer be sacrificed in the
name of family unity, courts needed to redefine good and bad families.
Families were no longer judged by the marital status of the parents.
Accordingly, illegitimate children were allowed to recover support
from their fathers, 77 unwed fathers were given custody rights, 78 and
unwed mates were granted support payments. 79 All of these changes
benefited the previously excluded individuals.
Nevertheless, courts still distinguished the good from the bad.
Courts were willing to intervene in families that abused family mem8 or engaged in criminal conduct.8 1 Courts were willing to repress
bersw
individual sexual freedom in bad groups. Thus, courts upheld a ban
on homosexual activity in the Navy,8 and sustained sodomy laws that
prohibited private homosexual relations.8 In spite of the dramatic
shift toward individual rights, courts still protected the good and ostracized the bad.
IV.

THE PROBLEM WITH THE DICHOTOMY BETWEEN
THE FAMILY AND THE INDIVIDUAL

A.

Intolerance of Heterogeneity

Schneider has suggested that the rise of individualism has been
associated with a decline in morality." He notes that courts no longer
73. See statutes cited supra note 1.
74. See UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 308, 9A U.L.A. 160 (1979) (spouse entitled
to support only if unable to support self or if custodian for small children).
75. See Freed & Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 19 FAM. L.Q. 331,
401 (1986).
76. See generally JOINT CUSTODY AND SHARED PARENTING (J. Folberg ed. 1984).
77. See, e.g., Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
78. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
79. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
80. See, e.g., People v. Cameron, 53 Cal. App. 3d 786, 126 Cal. Rptr. 44 (Ct. App. 1975).
81. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 40.
82. Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
83. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
84. Schneider, supra note 14.
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asked "what is right?," but rather, "what works?" Thus, in Danforth,8
the Court suggested that allowing a husband consent privileges concerning an abortion would not work to unify a marriage. Similarly, in
Trammel," the Court held that permitting a spouse to exercise a
testimonial privilege would not work to save a marriage.
Although using the language of social utility, the courts were still
making moral judgments. As previously noted, both the pro-family
decisions and the individualistic decisions protected the good and ostracized the bad. All that changed were the definitions of good and bad.
Both paradigms set up a fairly rigid set of expectations about what
was good. The pro-family paradigm rewarded a unified nuclear family
with two legally married parents and their legitimate children.8 7 The
individualistic paradigm rewarded strong, economically independent,
middle-class individuals. 83 Under both paradigms, those who did not
conform to the norm were penalized. For example, in the pro-family
era, Mormons 9 and illegitimates suffered. In the individualistic era,
the underclass 9l and homosexuals 92 suffered. This tendency to see
families as good or bad meant that both paradigms were intolerant of
non-conforming lifestyles. Thus, the tendency to dichotomize between
the individual and the family exacerbated intolerance for natural
heterogeneity.
B.

Fostering Divisiveness

The tendency to focus on individuals instead of the family as a unit
also fosters divisiveness. Consider, for example, testimonial privileges.
Traditionally, spouses could not testify against each other in criminal
trials,9 3 a rule that helped preserve marriages. In Trammel,- the
Supreme Court held that this testimonial privilege belonged only to
the testifying spouse, and hence, one spouse could testify against the
other.

85.
86.
87.

Danforth, 482 U.S. at 71.
Trammel, 445 U.S. at 52.
See supra § II.E.

88. See infra § V.F.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 50; see also infra note 125 and accompanying text.
See Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
See Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
Trammel, 445 U.S. at 40.
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A major problem with Trammel is that it focused on individuals
instead of on the family unit. Schneider argues that this tendency is
inherent in the very notion of rights.
[T]he rights schema is often inapposite in the family context,
since there a right against the government is also a right
against other family members ....

To put the point some-

what differently, our tendency to constitutionalize family law
and thus to think of it in terms of rights means that, when
the law transfers moral decisions, it transfers them to individuals rather than to families, thus sustaining the image of
the family as a collection of discrete individuals. 95
But the problem in Trammel is not that the Court was discussing the
nature of rights or privileges, but rather that in doing so, the Court
concentrated on individual rights. Arguably, the family in Trammel
needed a right, a family right, to assert against the government.
Nothing inherent in the nature of rights limits them to individuals.
Rights may belong to groups such as families as well as to individuals.
V. A THEORY OF FAMILY RIGHTS

A.

The Nature of Rights

When individual independence replaced family unity as the pervasive goal in family law, the new rules were expressed as rights. For
example, consider the right of illegitimates to support,9 the right of
unwed fathers to custody, 97 and the right of an unmarried lover to
support payments. 98 In order to understand this new theory of family
rights, one must first understand the nature of rights.
The word "right" can be used in both a moral and a legal sense.
Morally, a person has acted "rightly" by doing what ought to be done.
In this sense, right is the opposite of wrong. At least arguably, a
legal right is simply a codification of what a legislature or a court
believes is morally right. Dworkin suggests that a rule differs from
an order because a rule is normative and sets standards for behavior
that affect the subject of the rule beyond the mere threat of rule
enforcement.99 As Dworkin implies, however, a legal right is different

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Schneider, supra note 14, at 1858.
Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 19-20 (1977).
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from a mere moral right because the government does have enforcement power. Thus, one must respect another's legal rights.
Some rights are more important than others. We call some rights,
such as free speech, freedom of religion, and privacy, "fundamental"
because we believe they are so basic that they must never be infringed.
Some of these fundamental rights are constitutionally guaranteed in
the Bill of Rights. Others are not. Dworkin argues that the only
fundamental rights are those that affect dignity or equality. He states
that a person enjoys fundamental rights against government if the
rights are necessary to protect the person's dignity or standing.100
As Dworldn uses the term "dignity," he means more than a subjective notion of propriety. He uses the term to summarize Kant's
categorical imperative to treat others as we would like to be treated.10
When we treat others in ways we would not want to be treated, we
have impinged on their dignity.
B.

Privacy as a FundamentalRight

Using this analysis, we see that the Court was correct in viewing
privacy as a fundamental constitutional right. Few of us would want
others to inquire into the intimate details of our home lives. Because
invading family privacy poses a direct threat to dignity in Dworkin's
sense of the word, family privacy must be a fundamental right.
The strongest critics of individualistic liberalism might argue that
privacy is merely a device to superimpose the will of the individual
over the common welfare. These critics reject Kant's categorical imperative altogether.12 Nevertheless, privacy is so deeply rooted in our
history that privacy itself may constitute one of the community's notions of the common welfare. At least one author has noted that
contrasting political viewpoints agree that government regulation or
influence should not affect certain private activities. 0 3 As our analysis
of the pro-family paradigm indicates, courts have recognized some
sort of right of privacy for hundreds of years.

100.
101.

Id. at 199.
Id. at 198.

102.

See M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982).

103. Mlnooldn, The Public/PrivateDichotomy: PoliticalDisagreement and Academic Repudiation, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1429, 1430 (1982).
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1. The Definition Problem: The Consequentialist View
and Homosexuality
The problem with a fundamental right of privacy is that although
we may all agree that the right should exist, we do not all agree on
what should be included within the right. As Mnooldn points out,
liberals consider sexuality a private sphere, but view economics as a
public sphere. Conservatives, on the other hand, strongly endorse
private economic enterprise, but favor regulation of sexual matters,
such as abortion and homosexuality.104 Because we have no definitive
standards to determine what is private, courts have defined the private
sphere to correspond with subjective notions of good and bad. As a
result, one can argue that the dichotomy between public and private
is meaningless, and that we should base decisions solely on desirable
consequences. 10 5 Loosely translated, this seems to mean courts may
appropriately make subjective evaluations of the community's view of
the common welfare.
Two problems with the consequentialist view are apparent. First,
it ignores that in some instances, privacy is the central issue in the
case. Second, it condones intolerance. Bowers v. Hardwick'6 illustrates
both problems. In Bowers, the ultimate issue should not have been
whether homosexuality was good or bad, but rather whether the state
had any right to intrude into the privacy of Hardwick's bedroom. In
this context, to suggest that the dichotomy between public and private
is meaningless is absurd. The distinction between homosexual behavior
in a public restroom and that in a private bedroom is a crucial one,
and cannot be dismissed. By refusing to apply privacy standards, the
Court adopted the consequentialist view. Because the Georgia legislature and that of twenty-three other states had decided that homosexuality was immoral,107 the Court would not tolerate homosexuality,
even in the privacy of Hardwick's home. The result of the decision
was intolerance for any deviation from the majority's idea of good.
2. The Balancing Problem: Wife Abuse
In spite of the definitional problems, we return to the notion that
a fundamental right to privacy exists. Clearly, though, the right to

104. Id.
105. See id. at 1435.
106. 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
107. See id. at 2845 (citing Survey on the ConstitutionalRight to Privacy in the Context
of Homosexual Activity, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 521, 524 n.9 (1986)).
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privacy is not necessarily paramount in all situations. We would be
far more willing to apply the consequentialist standard in a wife-beating case like State v. Rhodes. 08 In such a situation, we might be
willing to disregard the husband's right to privacy in order to physically protect the wife. Even Dworkin admits that fundamental rights
may be limited to accommodate other rights. Dworkin finds it acceptable to balance rights when government faces a choice between equally
valid but competing rights.0 9 Courts must balance the right of privacy
against the individual's right to be secure from physical violence.
C.

A New Theory of Family Rights

The attempt to balance these rights illustrates the two basic principles of the new theory of family rights. First, fundamental family
rights belong both to the family as a group, and to each individual
family member." 0 Second, when competing rights need to be accommodated, the objectively weaker party should take priority.
Consider the facts in Rhodes."' The state prosecuted a husband
for beating his wife, and the husband asserted his right of family
privacy as a bar." 2 Applying the first principle, we find that both the
husband and the wife had an equal interest in asserting the family
right of privacy, but by pressing charges against her husband, the
wife waived her right. Once the state filed suit, the facts were publicly
disclosed, thus destroying any actual confidentiality. Arguably, however, the wife had no authority to waive the husband's right of privacy.
Therefore, we must apply the second principle when balancing the
husband's right of privacy against the wife's right not to be beaten.
Because we presume the aggressor is the stronger party, we protect
the rights of the weaker victim and decide that the wife's right not
to be beaten outweighs the husband's right to privacy.
D.

The Context of Rights: Vertical and Horizontal

Notice that rights only arise in an adversary context. One only
has rights against other people or the government. Thus, rights arise

108. 62 N.C. (Phil. Law) 453 (1868).
109. R. DWORKIN, supra note 99, at 199.
110. The theory need not be limited to fundamental rights. It can be applied to lesser
interests that inhere in the family as a whole. For example, in the context of a wrongful life
action, a court held that the duty to correctly diagnose hereditary deafness extended beyond
the child examined to embrace the entire family, including a sibling not yet conceived. Turpin
v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 230, 643 P.2d 954, 960, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 343 (1982).
111. Rhodes, 62 N.C. at 453.
112. Id. at 459.
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within two contexts: the vertical context, in which rights protect
families or individuals from the government or other outside agencies;
and the horizontal context, in which rights protect individuals from
other individuals. The new focus on individualism has obscured the
potential need to protect the family unit as a whole from government
intrusion."2 Communitarians criticize the entire concept of individual
rights as artificially isolating individuals from the communities to which
they belong.1 4 The family is one such community. Because the government is much more powerful than any family, we must be especially
vigilant in protecting family rights from government intrusion.
E.

The Vertical Context: Protecting Families
Against the Government
1. Spousal Testimonial Privileges

The need for vigilance is best illustrated by the Supreme Court's
decision in Trammel." 5 There, a husband and wife, as well as other
co-conspirators, were arrested on drug charges. The government
agreed not to prosecute the wife if she would testify against her
husband. The husband asserted his spousal testimonial privilege to
prevent his wife from testifying. 116 Such a spousal privilege had been
recognized at common law since the Middle Ages. 17 Although the
privilege had never been characterized as a constitutional right, it is
fundamental in Dworkin's sense of the word.
The Court in Trammel recognized that the spousal privilege was
an ancient one designed to protect marriages.," However, the Court
suggested that if a wife were willing to testify, there could not be
much of a marriage left to save." 9 Accordingly, the Court held that
the privilege belonged only to the testifying spouse. The Court found

113. See L. TRIBE, AMiERIcAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 988 (1978): "Once the State, whether
acting through its courts or otherwise, has 'iberated' the child - and the adult - from the
shackles of such intermediate groups as family, what is to defend the individual against the
combined tyranny of the State and her own alienation?"
114. See M. SANDEL, supra note 102; supra note 95 and accompanying text.
115. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 40.
116. Id. at 42-43.
117. See E. COKE, supra note 18.
118. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 44.
119. Id. Note the similarity to the Court's view in Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75, that it may
be futile for the government to try to preserve family harmony. This idea has been more fully
explored by Schneider, supra note 14.
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that the societal interest in criminal convictions outweighed the Trammels' interest in preserving a damaged relationship.120
At first glance, Trammel might seem similar to Rhodes, in which
the wife arguably waived the family right. But a distinction is immediately obvious. In Rhodes, the wife came to the government seeking protection from her husband. Her actions were certainly voluntary.
In Trammel, the wife acted under government compulsion. Her choice
was either to testify or to be prosecuted herself. Thus, her waiver
was not truly free and voluntary.
But, even if Elizabeth Trammel had been acting voluntarily, she
had no right to waive a family right for her husband. The first principle
of the new rights theory is that fundamental rights belong both to
the family as a group, and to each individual family member. The
testimonial privilege therefore belongs to both the defendant and the
testifying spouse, and either one should be able to assert that privilege.
Since the testimonial privilege is fundamental, the government
cannot override it merely to obtain criminal convictions. As Dworkin
explains:
There would be no point in the boast that we respect individual rights unless that involved some sacrifice, and the
sacrifice in question must be that we give up whatever marginal benefits our country would receive from overriding
these rights when they prove inconvenient. So the general
2 1
benefit cannot be a good ground for abridging rights .... 1
Applying this article's second premise gives a similar result. When
competing interests are involved, the objectively weaker party should
take priority. Faced with the choice of testimony or jail, Elizabeth
Trammel was powerless. Obviously, the Trammel family was decidedly
less powerful than the federal government. Hence, the family right
to a spousal testimonial privilege should have prevailed.,2. Parent/Child Testimonial Privileges
Applying the principles suggested in this article shows that testimonial privileges should be expanded, not contracted. United States v.
Penn'2" illustrates why. In Penn, the police had a warrant to search

120.
121.
122.

Trammel, 445 U.S. at 52.
R. DWORKIN, supra note 99, at 193.
The government solicited family disloyalty when it offered Elizabeth Trammel the

opportunity to testify in return for leniency. See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 42.
123. 647 F.2d 876 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 903 (1980).
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Clara Penn's home for drugs. Once on the premises, the police isolated
Penn's five year old son and bribed him into showing them where
some heroin was hidden. The trial court found it shocking that the
policeman had bribed the child to obtain evidence to implicate the
child's mother. 124The Ninth Circuit reversed, indicating that although
the policeman had acted reprehensibly, such conduct was acceptable
because the court found the Penns' family relationship undesirable. 2 -3
Although the Trammel Court had only hinted that bad families had
no rights, the Penn court virtually admitted as much. Such a concept
undermines the idea of justice. Rawls has described as fundamental
the notion that persons are entitled to equality regardless of their
social station in life.,- We should be just as willing to protect the
privacy of the Penn home as the privacy of the Griswold home.
If the Penn court had applied the two principles advanced in this
article, it would have reached a far more just result. First, because
family rights belong to the entire family, either the child or his mother
would have been able to assert either a testimonial privilege or a
family right of privacy. Second, because the court was balancing the
right of a child, a mother, and a family against the government, the
family members should have prevailed because they were less powerful.
Note that this theory works well in the vertical context, where
we need to protect the family unit or its individuals from the government. 127 Theoretically, the sole function of rights is to protect individuals or families. A purist might argue that rights should be used only
to protect individuals, not to allocate privileges among them. To stop
there, however, would ignore the more complex problems that arise
in the horizontal context, where individuals compete against each
other.

124. Id. at 879.
125. See Penn, 647 F.2d at 881: "[Wie would not fulfill our duty ... unless we took into
account what manner of family unit it was. It was a family unit in which the mother involved
her children deeply in the actual operation of her heroin-dealing business."
126. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 511 (1971).
127. At least one court already has recognized this distinction between the vertical context
and the horizontal context. Romeo v. Romeo, 84 N.J. 289, 418 A.2d 258 (1980). There, although
New Jersey law refused to recognize spousal contracts because they created family disharmony,
the court recognized an employment contract between a husband and wife in order to allow the
wife to recover a workmen's compensation award for her husband's death. The court noted that
the rule against interspousal contracts, which was meant to protect spouses in the horizontal

context within the family, need not be followed in the family's vertical relationship to the insurer.
See id. at 297-303, 418 A.2d at 263-66.
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F. The Horizontal Context: Allocating Rights
Between Family Members
1. Child Custody

We proceed beyond the vertical context for two reasons. First,
the distinction between protection and allocation is a fuzzy one, especially in family law. For example, in order to protect a child's financial
security, one may need to reallocate resources between the child's
divorced parents. Second, a theory of family rights that failed to
address the sticky questions that arise in the horizontal context would
not be a useful theory. Most questions in family law address competing
interests of different family members. Thus, the next step is to apply
the theory in the horizontal context to allocate the rights of competing
individuals, for example, in child custody disputes.
Balancing competing interests within the family calls for the second
proposition of the theory: the weakest individuals should get the greatest protection. First, we must identify the weakest. The children have
the least economic power, and the least control over their destiny.
Protecting children must be one of the primary goals of any child
custody scheme. Thus, where evidence of unfitness appears, especially
if a propensity for any form of violence emerges, the court must
protect the children by awarding sole custody to the other parent.
The real problem, however, arises when both parents are fit and
have no history of violence. It may seem paradoxical to suggest custody
should be awarded to the weaker party, even if we only mean the
financially weaker party. To fully understand the application of the
theory, then, we need to examine the actual practice in child custody
disputes.
Increasingly, child custody has become yet another bargaining chip
in the financial arrangements of a divorce. Although most states make
no legal connection between custody and child support payments, in
the typical negotiated settlement, a parent who wishes to gain sole
custody must make some financial concessions. Given the context of
a negotiated settlement, it is virtually impossible to separate custody
from financial considerations. 1' Now that alimony is relatively rare, 129

128. Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce,
88 YALE L.J. 950, 959-60 (1979) ("[Mjarital property, alimony, and child-support issues are all
basically problems of money, and the distinctions among them become very blurred ....
[T]he
money and custody issues are inextricably linked.").
129. See supra note 74. Glendon suggests that alimony is relevant only in a small portion

of cases because most families simply do not have the resources to support two households. M.
GLENDON, supra note 14, at 82.
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concessions must come from property settlements and child support
payments. That scenario creates two problems. First, the worse a
parent is, the more financial concessions the other parent will make
to prevent the bad parent from getting custody. Thus, a parent who
is truly concerned about the welfare of the child may be willing to
bargain away the child's financial security to guarantee the child's
emotional security. Second, parents who choose to stay home with
their children are at a tremendous disadvantage. Much of their identity
may be tied to their custodial role, yet they have relatively little
financial bargaining power. These parents, too, may be tempted to
bargain away their means of support to retain custody.130
The theory's preference for the weaker party helps to balance the
scales in the negotiation process. The theory would create a presumption in favor of the weaker parent. The presumption would give additional bargaining power to a concerned or financially insecure parent.
Thus, the parent would not have to forfeit a child's financial security
to retain custody. As a result, negotiated support payments should
increase, and the children of divorced parents should be more financially secure. The mechanism for this presumption already exists in
several states that have adopted some form of a presumption in favor
of the primary caretaker in custody disputes. 131
Of course, when both parents have comparable financial resources,
and hence equal bargaining power, neither one is weaker. In that
instance, no presumption is necessary to balance the scales, and the
parties may negotiate appropriate custody arrangements without
jeopardizing the financial security of the children.
2. AlimonyThe theory can also be applied horizontally to help a court decide
alimony issues. In the pro-family era, alimony was linked to good

130. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 128.
131. See, e.g., Berndt v. Berndt, 292 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1980); In re Maxwell, 8 Ohio App.
2d 302, 456 N.E.2d 1218 (1982); Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981). This preference
for the primary care-taker is sex-neutral. See, e.g., J.E.I. v. L.M.I., 314 S.E.2d 67 (IV. Va.
1984) (holding that the father was the primary caretaker).
132. Many regard alimony (or more recently "spousal support") as an outdated concept, for
pragmatic as well as philosophical reasons. Admittedly, few families can afford to support two
households, so the concept is often irrelevant. See M. GLENDON, supra note 14, at 82. If,
however, the concept helps to protect even a miniscule portion of the population, it serves a
useful purpose.
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conduct.1 3 Courts punished straying husbands with the obligation to
support well-behaved ex-vives.' M
The shift to individualism reflected the fact that more women were
working outside the home. These strong, economically independent
women had a less valid claim to support. Legislatures and courts
began to look at alimony as rehabilitative. 13 Short-term alimony would
enable women to become economically independent, but long-term
support was disfavored. 36
But problems with the new approach are evident. First, not all
women are economically independent. Many women still have roles
only as wives and mothers. Fifty-two percent of mothers of infants
and thirty-three percent of mothers of pre-school children do not work
outside the home. 137 These women are necessarily economically dependent:

133. See supra note 42.
134. E.g., Poppe v. Poppe, 114 Ind. App. 348, 52 N.E.2d 506 (1944) (holding that an
adulterous husband had to give his wife more than 90% of the value of his assets).
135. There is a definite trend to adopt rehabilitative alimony. For example, in California,
in 1968, only 1/3 of the spousal support awards had a specific date for termination. By 1977,
2/3 of the awards were for a limited time period, with a median duration of 25 months. Weitzman,
The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of Property,Alimony and Child
Support Awards, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1181, 1226 (1981). By 1983, 22 other states had made
rehabilitative awards: Arizona, ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-319(B)(2) (1976); Colorado, COLO.
REV. STAT. § 14-10-114(2)(b) (1974 & Supp. 1986); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1502(6)
(1981); Florida, Mertz v. Mertz, 287 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 2d. D.C.A. 1973); FLA. STAT. § 61.08(1)
(1985); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. § 580-47(a)(13) (1985); Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 32-705(2)(b)
(1983); Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, T 504(b)(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); Indiana, IND.
CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-11 (Burns 1980); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(b)(2) (1983);
Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.200(2)(b) (MichiefBobbs-Merrill 1984); Maryland, MD.
FAm. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-106(b)(2) (1984); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.552 (West
Supp. 1986-1987); Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.335.2(2) (Vernon 1986); Montana, MONT.
CODE ANN. § 40-4-203(2)(b) (1985); New Hampshire, Comer v. Comer, 110 N.H. 505, 272 A.2d
586 (1970); New York, N.Y. Doi. REL. LAW § 236(B)(6)(a)(4) (McKinney 1986); Oregon, In
re Marriage of Stewart, 59 Or. App. 713, 651 P.2d 1379 (Ct. App. 1982); Pennsylvania, 23 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 501(b) (Purdon Supp. 1987); Tennessee, Stone v. Stone, 56 Tenn. App.,
409 S.W.2d 388 (1966); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 751(b)(4) (Supp. 1986); Washington,
Dakin v. Dakin, 62 Wash. 2d 687, 384 P.2d 639 (1963) (en banc); Wisconsin, Carty v. Carty,
87 Wis. 2d 759, 275 N.W.2d 888 (1979).
136. At least four states have no provisions for long-term alimony: Delaware, DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 13, § 1512(a)(3) (1981) (no long-term alimony unless married more than 20 years);
New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458.19 (1983); Pennsylvania, 23 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 501(c) (Purdon 1980); Texas, In re Long, 542 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. 1976); Francis v. Francis,
412 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. 1967).
137. See A New Family Issue, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 26, 1987, at 22.
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Under modern conditions, where the work place is usually
distant from the family dwelling, the devotion of the mother
entirely to child-raising and care of the household meant that
she ordinarily had to forego outside work. At first this was
seen as a luxury. It is only recently, when divorce has become common, that it has become clear what a price women
who are not independently wealthy may have to pay for
having left the primitive production community and the market-place for the home. It was one thing to be economically
dependent in a world where divorce in both the de facto and
legal sense was exceptional, where the norms of convention,
custom, ethics and religion supported the ideal of indissolubility of marriage. It was quite another to be economically
dependent in a world where divorce came more and more
to be considered a right, necessary for each individual's pursuit of happiness or self-fulfillment.13
If these women stay out of the workplace for many years, they often
find themselves in middle age with few job opportunities. 39 The new
alimony rules allow ex-husbands to enjoy a middle age of prosperity,'4 0
while ex-wives are relegated to relative poverty.
Second, many working women have difficulty supporting themselves and their children. Although most women work, their earnings
are only approximately sixty-five percent of men's.'4,
The salary differential in the job market leaves women at a decided disadvantage.
Third, even well-educated women may find their earning power
diminished if they take time off for child bearing. Many of these
women hold only part-time jobs at lower pay than full-time jobs."'Frequently, re-entry into the job market after a few years off is
difficult, and women must accept jobs at only a fraction of their prior

salaries. "43
Nevertheless, simply returning to the old alimony rules would be
unfair to men whose wives earn as much as or more than they do.

138. M. GLENDON, STATE LAW AND FAMILY 136-37 (1977).
139. Note, Rehabilitative Alimony: An Old Wolf in New Clothes, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 667, 669 (1984-1985).
140. See D. CHAMBERS, MAKING FATHERS PAY 48 (1979); Weitzman, supra note 135, at
1241.
141. U.S. DEPT OF COMMERCE BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES (107th ed. 1987).
142. Weitzman, supra note 135, at 1230 (citing Barrett, Women in the Job Market: Unemployment and Work Schedules, in THE SUBTLE REVOLUTION 81 (R. Smith ed. 1979)).
143. Id.
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Applying the second principle solves these problems. Courts should
determine who is the objectively weaker party and adjust alimony
accordingly. Thus, a spouse of twenty-two years who had never
worked would be entitled to full support. If both spouses work but
one earned substantially less than the other, the lower paid spouse
would be entitled to partial support to equalize the earnings. A welleducated spouse who had taken time off for children would be given
temporary support until able to recapture former earnings potential.
VI.

LIMITS OF THE THEORY

Naturally, this theory is not perfect. One of the problems with the
idea that conflicts should be resolved in favor of the objectively weaker
party is that power and justice are not the same. An individual's
economic or political weakness does not mean that such an individual
should prevail over a stronger one. One reason for the shift to individualism was a societal view that individuals should have to be selfsufficient. - Thus, to the extent that priority for the weaker individual
rewards dependency, such priority may not be a wise idea.
Nevertheless, dependency is not inherently evil. Instead, it may
be the unfortunate side effect of the decision to stay home to raise
young children.15 That decision is necessarily a personal one, and
depends on a wide range of factors such as earning power, cost of
child care, the age of the children, and the personal preferences of
the couple. Society as a whole has no vested interest in that parental
decision.
The problem, then, is to draft a neutral rule that will permit the
parties to choose dependency or self-sufficiency without rewards or
penalties. Freedom of contract would seem to perform that role. But
in actuality, most family decisions are seldom reduced even to oral
contracts. Even when they are, they are subject to change to reflect
changing circumstances, such as the birth of a child. This article argues
that the self-sufficient are so well-rewarded with status and money,
and hence, so powerful, that we need to protect the dependents more.
Even when the preference does not specifically reward dependency,
there may be some problems with a preference that may be reduced
in practice to a simple preference for women and children. Recently,
one state has allowed children to disassociate themselves from their
admittedly fit parents. 146 Because children are arguably weaker than
144. See Molnar v. Molnar, 314 S.E.2d 73, 76 (W. Va. 1984) (holding that the purpose of
rehabilitative alimony is to encourage spouses to be self-supporting).
145. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
146. In re Synder, 85 Wash. 2d 182, 532 P.2d 278 (1975).
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their parents, strictly applying our principles could mean that any
teenager unhappy with parents' rules could successfully petition to be
removed from the family. In this circumstance, however, the teenager
may not always be objectively weaker. In the emotional battleground
for control, parents, especially single ones, may have less actual power.
That argument illustrates another problem with the theory. Deciding which party is objectively weaker is not always easy. We need to
establish some standard for defining "weaker." At the least, that standard should include some measure of economic power, but other standards may need to be developed as the rule is applied.
Finally, some critics may argue that the theory is simply a return
to protectionism. Women, the critics may argue, will be characterized
as less powerful, and demeaned in the process. 147 There are two responses to these criticisms. First, the theory calls for an objective
determination of the weaker party. Frequently children have the least
power. Occasionally men may be the weaker parties.4 Each situation
must be evaluated separately. To presume that women will always be
the least powerful is a sexist attitude. Second, we must recognize that
many women are economically disadvantaged. Women generally earn
less than men, 49 and women who stay home to raise their children
are economically dependent. 150 To structure a system as if all people
had equal economic power is to ignore reality and deny protection to
those who need it most.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The pendulum of family rights has swung from absolute preference
for the family unit to absolute preference for individuals. The process
has manipulated our privacy rights to reflect the pendulum's position,
resulting in an artificial dichotomy between the individual and the
family. We can avoid this unnecessary conflict if we adopt a theory
of family rights that holds that fundamental family rights belong both
to the family as a whole, and to each of its individuals; and that when
competing rights must be accommodated, the objectively weaker party
should have priority. This new theory works in both the vertical context, to protect the family and its members from the government,
and in the horizontal context, to weigh the rights of individuals. The
result is a balance between unbridled individualism and familialism.
147. See M. GLENDON, supra note 14, at 83.
148. Thus, in J.E.I. v. L.M.I., 314 S.E.2d 67 (W. Va. 1984), the court found that the father
was the primary caretaker, and in the terminology of this article, the objectively weaker party.
149. See supra note 141.
150. See M. GLENDON, supra note 138 and accompanying text.
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